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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATl'RE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Lucia Navo, Serena Navo, and Nicole Navo (Navos), appeal the District 
Court's decision to dismiss defendant/respondent Bingham Memorial Hospital (Brv1H) from their 
wrongful death claims stemming from the death of Ellery Navo after he had received surgery at 
BMH to replace a rod in an infected broken ankle. Navos allege that the District Court erred in 
excluding their hospital expert on summary judgment. and then later dismissing BMH entirely 
from the case despite factual issues as to the hospital· s potential liability under the doctrine of 
apparent authority. 
COl:RSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On December 29, 2010. Navos filed their Complaint alleging, in four counts, the right to 
recmer damages from Sayre 1 and BMH for the ,vrongful death of their husband and father. R., 
Vol. 1. pp. 1, 26-31. 2 Sayre answered denying liability on July 18. 2011. R., Vol. I, pp. 2, 
On August 24, 201 L defendants Sayre and Monroe filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R., Vol. I, p. 3. Since the case against Monroe has been dropped, and the case against 
1 The Complaint named not only nurse anesthetist Sayre as a defendant. but also nurse 
anesthetist Matthew _Monroe. In the course of discovery it became clear that although both 
anesthetists cared for Ellery Navo during the surgery, the damage to Ellery \\as complete before 
Momoe took over from Sayre. Thus, plaintiffs did not pursue the case further against Monroe. 
2 The Clerk's Record as provided to the plaintiffs consisted of three (3) electronic files, 
each having pages separately numbered beginning with page 1. Plaintiff has identified those files 
in this brief as: (1) the file entitled "Clerk's Record on Appeal," which consists of pages 1-1099, 
as Volume I; (2) the file entitled "Clerk's Supplemental Record on Appeal," which consists of 
pages 1-14, as Volume II; and (3) the file entitled "Supplemental Clerk's Record on Cross 
Appeal, which consists of pages 1-236, as Volume III. 
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no further discussion that motion for summary judgment follows 
as to BMH. 
BMH never filed an Answer to the Complaint. Instead, it filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on November 17. 201 L supported by the Afiidavit of Cynthia Christensen. the 
Affidavit of Dan Cochran. and a brief R.. Vol. I. pp. 4. 40-41. 57-60, 42-51. 
Pursuant to a scheduling order entered by the court on December 19, 2011, R .. Vol. I. pp. 
93-94. on January 18.2012, the Nmos filed an Affidavit of Counsel. the Affidavit of Samuel H. 
Steinberg. and a brief in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. R .. Vol. L pp. 6. 
95-255.256-268.295-312. 
After the matter \Vas fully submitted. on February 27. 201 the trial court issued its 
Decision: Defendants' Motion fr,r Summary Judgment & Motions to Strike, as \Vell as a 
Judgment thereon. R., Vol. I. pp. 7, 397-416. The court's decision struck the entire Affidavit of 
Samuel H. Steinberg and granted summary judgment to BMIL as well as to Sayre and J'v1onroe. 
Navos moved for reconsideration of the court's decision on March 12, 2012, supported by 
Supplemental affidavits of Dr. Peter Schulman and Dr. Samuel Steinberg. R.. Vol. L pp. 8. 
417-436. On July 24. 2012. the District Court issued its Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider and Defendants' Motions to Strike. R., Vol. I. pp. 494-516. The court granted 
Navos· motion to reconsider as to Sayre and BMH on Count One of the Complaint but upheld 
its prior decision on summary judgment as to Counts Two, Three and Four. R., Vol. I, p. 515. 
Thereafter, on March 20, 2013, BMH moved for reconsideration of the court's July 24, 
2012, decision leaving open Count One as to BMH based on the theory of apparent autbority. R., 
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L pp. 589-590. That motion was renev,:ed tvvo weeks later on April 4. 13. vvith 
Bl\1H filed a memorandum and the affidavits of and of Jeff Daniels. R.. 
Vol. L pp. 695-696, 807-808. NaYos offered the affidavit of Lucia Navo in opposition to BMtr s 
renewed motion. Vol. I, pp. 946-851. On April 17, 2013. only two days before the April 19. 
2013. hearing scheduled on the motion. BMH offered the affidavit of Janelle K. Larsen in 
support of its motion. R .. Vol. L pp. 957-970. Narns filed a "l\fotion to Strike Untimely 
Affidavits" on April 18. 2013. On May 31. 2013. the court issued its Decision on Motions 
granting BMH's motion for reconsideration. deciding that plaintiffs had failed to adequately 
plead the legal theory of apparent authority and that, even if it had properly pied that theory, 
BMH vvas entitled to summary judgment on the issue. R.. Vol. L pp. 1015-1024. This decision 
resolved all claims involving BMH against the Narns. but left open the matters against Sayre for 
trial. The court declined to enter a Rule 54(b) Certificate of Final Judgment as requested by 
BMH. R., Vol. L p. 1040. 
As the result of a settlement between Sayre and Navos, on June 18, 2014, the parties filed 
a Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice of Plaintiffs' Claims Against Defendant Ryan Sayre. 
R .. Vol. L pp. ] 070-1071 . That having resulted in a resolution of all claims of all parties, the 
court entered final judgment dismissing all claims against all parties, with prejudice, on August 
4, 2014. R., Vol. I, p. 1074. 
Forty-two days later, on September 15, 2014, Navos filed their Notice of Appeal as 
against the defendant, Bingham Memorial Hospital, only. R., Vol. I, pp. I 076-1078. 
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STATEME:\T O_F FACTS 
rs motion for summary Judgment focused exclusively on relating to 
standard of care and its compliance or non-compliance \Vith that standard. But the background 
facts have never been contested. 
On December 15. 2008. Ellery Navo. a 36 year-old Natiw American member of the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe. was admitted into Bingham Memorial Hospital for treatment of an 
infected ankle that had been surgically repaired the previous month. On December 19. 2008, the 
decision was made to surgically remove the rod that had been inse11ed to repair Ellery·s ankle. 
That surgery took place the following day at approximately 12:30 p.111. 
Sayre administered the anesthesia through a procedure referred to as a --spinal.,. Shortly 
after the anesthesia \\'as administered, Ellery·s blood pressure, heart rate, and oxygen levels 
experienced a severe drop. He also lost control of his own breathing, and Sayre then converted 
the spinal anesthesia to general anesthesia. It \Vas some time before Ellery's systems were 
controlled and brought back to normal levels. After Ellery's systems were stabilized. Monroe 
took over anesthesia care of Ellery. but at the end of the surgery :t-.fonroe was unable to revive 
Ellery from the anesthesia and he remained unconscious and non-responsive until his death on 
December 30, 2008. R., Vol. L p. 298. 
Ellery Navo was survived by his spouse, Lucia Navo, and by tv,:o teenage daughters, 
Nicole and Serena Navo, who are the plaintiffs in this case. 
The crux ofNavos' complaint regarding the cause of Ellery's death is set forth in the 
Affidavit of Dr. Peter Schulman. a board certified anesthesiologist as well as an attending 
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physician and assistant professor of anesthesiology at Oregon Health & Science University in 
Portland. Oregon. R.. Vol. I. p. 270. Dr. Schulman gave his opinion that the care provided to 
Ellery Navo in December 2008 failed to meet the standard of health care practice in Blackfoot. 
Idaho. Among other problems. Dr. Schulman noted that: 
• Except for the word '·spinal"' listed on the Pre-Anesthesia form and vvhat \Vas 
listed at the top of the form. the preoperative anesthesia evaluation and anesthesia 
plan did not accurately reflect or take into account the full nature and extent of 
Ellery Navo· s pre-surgery co-morbid medical conditions. 
• Sayre did not discuss the case v,ith the surgeon. Dr. \Voods, or any other physi-
cian. anesthesiologist. or CRNA prior to the surgery. 
• Sayre's discussion with Ellery Navo about his medical history ,vas brief and he 
did not speak with Ellery" s vvife, children, or other relatives. 
• It vvas unclear whether Sayre reviewed Ellery·s chart or medical records prior to 
the procedure, and if he did, it was a cursory and superficial review. 
• Critical problems such as Ellery's morbid obesity, risk factors for obstructive 
sleep apnea, and recent fever were not noted on the pre-anesthesia form. 
• Ellery vvas administered a relatively high dose Propofol infusion (a powerful 
sedatiw-hypnotic typically used for sedation and/or for the induction of general 
anesthesia), the administration being at a fixed rate and not titrated to effect. 
• within five minutes after administration of the "spinal," Ellery experienced a 
profound drop in blood pressure (hypotension) and in heart rate (bradycardia) that 
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lasted for a significant period time. Ellery became unresponsive, although the 
length \Yas \Vas not 
• in addition. Ellery's blood oxygen saturadion dropped (hypoxemia). and again this 
was not accuratelv recorded on the anesthetic record. One record reflected ''mid 
70's and low 80's'· and another record showed a consistent ·'99%''. 
• The Propofol infusion was never down-titrated or turned off during the period of 
hypoxemia. 
• After Ellery's oxygen saturation dropped. Sayre administered Propofol as a 
'"bolus .. (a rapid intravenous injection). although this was not recorded. 
• To treat the hypotension and bradycardia, Sayre administered several doses of 
Ephedrine and one small dose of RobinuL but did not administer ephinephrine. 
• Sayre did not communicate with the surgeon other than to report Ellery's drop in 
heart rate and blood pressure, and he did not call other anesthesia providers for 
additional help. 
• This history reflects numerous unacceptable errors. 
In summary. Dr. Schulman opines, ''the cascading sequence of adverse events that ensued 
in this case were the direct result of inadequate preparation for anesthesia, a poorly designed and 
initiated anesthetic plan, and an inadequate response to the instability that ultimately occurred. 
This combination of factors, in the aggregate, resulted in Mr. Navo's death." R., Vol. I, pp. 
274-282. 
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noted, BMH's motion for summary judgment fixused on whether the hospital could 
held for Ellery s In its offered the two page 
affidavit of its chief nursing officer Cynthia Christensen, who essentially testified that the 
"nurses" responsible for Mr. Navo 'scare "complied ,vith the applicable local community 
standard of health care practice,. but that ·'nurses arc not involved in the decision-making process 
relative to" anesthesia care. R., Vol. L pp. 50-53. BMH also offered the affidavit of its COO Dan 
Cochran who claimed that anesthesia services are provided at the hospital by nurse anesthetists 
that are employed by Blackfoot Anesthesia Services. LLC. R., Vol. I, pp. 57-59. 3 
In response. Navos offered the affidavit and report of Dr. Samuel Steinberg. R., Vol. L 
pp. 256-268. Dr. Steinberg's experience and background included numerous years as a director 
and hl)Spital administrator. an MBA in health care administration, a Ph.D. in Organization & 
~1anagerncnt, and many years experience on a university faculty. R., Vol. L pp. 259-264. 
Dr. Steinberg's affidavit and report expressed his opinion that the care provided to Ellery 
Navo by BMH and its stair~ contractors, and employees violated certain specific Joint Commis-
sion standards, v;hich was a failure of the standard of health care practice in the community in 
·which BMH serves and operates. R., Vol. L p. 266. Because the Joint Commission standards are 
specifically adopted by regulations of the Idaho Department of Healtl1 and Welfare, and are 
3 BMH also filed a Second Affidavit of Jennifer Brizee and an Affidavit of Judith Nagel 
on January 20, 2012, the same day as the hearing held on the motion. R., Vol. I, pp. 321- 328, 
355-358. Seven days later, on January 27, 2012, BMH filed the Affidavit of Tina Cobia. R., 
Vol. I, pp. 371-380. The District Comi did not refer to any of these woefully late affidavits in its 
Memorandum Decision. R., Vol. I, pp. 397--429. 
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applicable by to hospitals throughout the State, Dr. Steinberg applied those 
to the conduct B!v1H. especially in relation to care to 
In particular. but not exclusively, he reported: 
• BMH lacked a required contract with Blackfoot Anesthesia Services. which 
provided Sayre as a nurse anesthetist to BMH and its patients. 
• BMH lacked a required collaboration agreement bet\veen Blackfoot Anesthesia 
Services· nurse anesthetists. such as Sayre. and a qualified physician. dentist or 
podiatrist. 
• BMH lacked the required Chief of Anesthesia/physician director of anesthesia 
services. 
• Biv1H lacked required policies and procedures, approved by the physician director 
of the anesthesia service, to guide the hospital's anesthesia program. 
R., Vol. L pp. 266-268. 
In short. BMH had no vvritten policies, requirements. contracts, or standards to govern the 
administration of anesthesia in its hospital. BMH had done essentially nothing to ensure that 
anesthesia provided by nurse anesthetists at its hospital \Vas done at any level of competence. 
Instead, it attempts to rely exclusively on Blackfoot Anesthesia Services to perform all of its 
responsibilities in that regard. As a result, Dr. Steinberg· s opined that B:rv1H violated the 
following Joint Commission Standards: 
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1. LD.1.10. ·'The hospital identifies how it is governed. hospital has 
vvith ultimate responsibility legal authority care. 
treatment. and services.'· 
J LD.1.30. ·The hospital complies \Vith applicable la'w and regulation.'· 
,.., 
.) . LD.2.20. '·Each hospital program, serYice. site. or department has effective 
leadership:· 
4. LD.3.50. ·'Care. treatment. and services provided through contractual agreement 
are provided safely and effectively."' 
Id. 
Dr. Steinberg indicated his knmvledge \Vith regard to the local standard of care as 
follov,s: 
"'These Joint Commission standards are \Videly accepted in the United States as the 
standard of care for the provision of inpatient hospital care, and describe the accountabil-
ity and responsibility of hospital leaders in the deli wry of care at their facilities. Joint 
Commission standards require that hospital leaders establish a governance structure and 
management systems to oversee that appropriate rules, regulations, infrastructure. 
credentialing, and communication processes are in place to deliver high quality and safe 
care to their patients. The hospital is further required to establish systems to monitor the 
effectiveness of care and to correct any deficiencies. Ultimately, the hospital is responsi-
ble for the oversight of all professional services provided by its medical staff employees. 
and any others that it credentials or contracts with to practice at the hospital. Joint 
Commission standards are also used by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid to 
determine compliance with the requirements of these programs, and are also used and 
accepted as the standard of care for hospital licensure in many states, including Idaho, and 
Bingham Memorial Hospital is accredited by the Joint Commission and must therefore 
comply with their standards. I have also spoken with Judith Nagel, RN, Associate 
Director of the Idaho State Board of Nursing on January 11, 2011 to affirm that the 
community standards in rural hospitals in Idaho regarding nurse anesthesia programs is 
similar to standards in place across the country that I am familiar with." 
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R .. Vol. L p. 266. 
Nan1s also offered the Affidm it of Counsel attaching a number of written 
discovery responses and deposition testimony that demonstrated. among other things. that: 
L BMI rs website lists Steve 1v1cC!ellan as the ··rv1anager·· of the .. Anesthesia 
Department.·· R .. Vol. L p. 100. It does not indicate that Mr. McClellan is the 
mvner and manager of Blackfoot Anesthesia Services. LLC. leading the public to 
believe that he is an employee and a part of hospital management (its Director of 
Anesthesia Services). R., Vol. I. pp. 109. 111. This also implies that the hospital 
provides anesthesia services. not an independent contractor. 
All of the anesthesia forms. i.e. the consent forms, pre-anesthesia forms, and 
anesthesia records. are all under BMH's letterhead. R., Vol. I, pp 292-295. 
3. BMH has historically engaged in an aggressive marketing and ad campaign, in 
print. on the radio, tv and billboards in the area encouraging people throughout the 
region to come to its hospital for services. and also claiming that it offered high 
quality health care services. R .. Vol. L pp. 96-97, 947. 
4. BMH has not publically indicated that its support services, including anesthesia 
care, are not pro\·ided by the hospital. Id. 
In support of its Motion for Reconsideration (re: apparent authority), BMH offered an 
affidavit of its COO, Jeff Daniels, who again claimed that the hospital does not bill for anesthesia 
services. R., Vol. I, pp. 807-809. BMH also offered the (late) Affidavit of Janelle K. Larsen 
attaching a number of"Conditions of Admission Forms" allegedly signed by Ellery Navo. R., 
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. I. pp. None of those forms are dated at the time that Mr. Navo \Vas admitted to 
the ankle ultimatelv lead to his death. Id. 
At no point has BMH disputed the substance of the evidence and claims brought by 
Na\ os in the case. Instead, it has consistently taken the position that it had no part in or responsi-
bility for supervising. overseeing. or providing anesthesia services it its hospital. The District 
Court excluded Dr. Steinberg solely on the basis that his testimony lacked foundation to sh0vv 
that he was familiar with the local standard of care as required under IC § 6-1012-13 ( discussed 
infra). 
ISSlJES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in holding that Dr. Samuel Steinberg lacked sufficient 
kno\\ledge of the local standard of care, as required under Idaho Code§§ 6-101 1013? 
') Did the District Court err in determining on summary judgment that there was 
insufficient support for Navos· claim that Sayre was acting as BMJTs agent \\bile performing 
anesthesia services on Ellery Navo, under the theory of apparent authority? 
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ARGt;MENT 
L STAJ\;DARD OF RE\IEW IS DE Novo RE\n:w. 
The standard of review as it pertains to a review of a decision on summary judgment, 
particularly as it relates to the qualification of an expert vvitness. was succinctly summarized by 
this Cornt in the recent decision of Malt ox v. Life Care Centers of America. Inc.. Idaho 
__ , 337 P.3d 627. 631-32 (2014): 
Id. 
·--on appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Cowi utilizes 
the same standard of review used by the district comt originally ruling on the 
motion.' Arregui v. Gallegos-V!ain, 153 Idaho 801,804,291 P.3d 1000. 1003 
(2012). Summary judgment is proper \Vhen 'the pleadings. depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. shmv that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflmv.' I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
·'When considering ·vvhcther the evidence shows a genuine issue of material fact, 
the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the nonmoving party.' Arregui, 153 Idaho at 804, 291 P.3d at 1003. 
'"The admissibility of expert testimony, however, is a threshold matter that is 
distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact suffi-
cient to preclude summary judgment.· Id. \Vith respect to the threshold issue of 
admissibility, '[t]he liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard does 
not apply .... ' Dulaney v. Sr. Alphonsus Reg'! ;'\/Jed. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 
P .3d 816, 819 (2002). Instead, · [ t]he trial court must look at the vvitness · affidavit 
or deposition testimony and determine \Yhether it alleges facts \vhich. if taken as 
true, \Yould render the testimony of that witness admissible.' Id. 
'·' A district court's evidentiary rulings \vill not be disturbed by this Court unless 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion.· 11vicDaniel v. Inland Nw. Renal Care 
Grp.-ldaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219,222, 159 P.3d 856,859 (2007). In applying the 
abuse of discretion standard, vve ask three questions: ' ( 1) whether the lower court 
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion: (2) whether the court acted \Vithin 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason.' Id. at 221-22, 159 P.3d at 858-59."' 
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IL DR. STEINBERG TESTIMONY, TAKEN AS TRlTE, MEETS THE THRESHOLD Qt AUFYl:\'G 
HL\1 AS A'i EXPERT UNDER IDAHO Com:§§ 6-1012-101 
The District Court excluded Dr. Steinberg's affidavit for the sole reason that his 
testimony did not adequately lay a foundation to suggest that he had the requisite familiarity \"-·ith 
the local standard of care, as required under Idaho Code§§ 6-1012-1013. R. VoL L p. 412. In 
the District Court·s initial Memorandum Decision. relying in large pan on Schmcchel r. Dille. 
148 Idaho 176. 219 P.3d 1192 (2009) (\vhich does not at all address the qualification of experts 
under Idaho Code §§ 6-1012-13) the District Court held that Dr. Steinberg could not rely upon 
the IDAPA rules to establish familiarity with the local standard of care. R .. Vol. I, p. 41 L The 
District Court also parsed Dr. Steinberg's affidavit to suggest that his consultation with Judith 
Nagel did not necessarily include information \Vhether the uniform standards of nurse anesthesia 
care at hospitals throughout Idaho included BMH.4 R., Vol. L pp. 409-411. Essentially. the 
District Court held that his affidavit did not contain the magic words "including Bingham 
Memorial Hospital in Blackfoot, Idaho.•· R., Vol. L p. 410. 
On Navos· Motion to Reconsider, wherein Navos pointed out holdings in Suhadolnik v. 
Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 114-115, 254 P.3d 11, 15-16 (2011) that suggested Dr. Steinberg 
could rely upon governmental regulations for the local standard of care, the District Court parsed 
Dr. Steinberg's affidavits further to suggest that the rules and regulations relied upon by Dr. 
Steinberg did not have anything to do with the "physical administration of health care services." 
R., Vol. I, pp. 503-505. However, the District Court does not specifically indicate how any of the 
4 The District Court erroneously held that Dr. Steinberg never identified BMH as a "rural 
hospital," which in fact he did. Dr. Steinberg specifically noted that BMH is listed as a "critical 
access hospital," which by federal regulation must be a rural hospital. R., Vol. I, p. 4271 4. 
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many blatant Yiolations of the Joint Commission standards (adopted by Idaho in its ID APA rules) 
do nor specifically apply to the .. physical administration of health care sen·ices." Id. 
Since the issuance of the District Court·s decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court bas 
addressed this particularly wxing issue. i.e .. an out-of-state expert" s avenues to obtain the 
requisite familiarity with the local standard of care to quali1~· as an expert witness. In its recent 
decision in Han ox 1·. Life Care Cenrers o/A merica. Inc.. the Court reiterated a framework for 
such qualification. emphasizing that it should not necessarily be a .. static:· but rather a .. common 
sense·· approach: 
.. The guiding question is simply \\hether the affida\it alleges facts \\hich. taken as 
true. sho\v the proposed expert has actual knowledge of the applicable standard of 
care. In addressing that question. courts must look to the standard of care at issue. 
the proposed expert's grounds for claiming knowledge of that standard, and 
determine- employing a measure of common sense-whether those grounds 
would likely give rise to kncnvledge of that standard. The obligation to 
dernonstrate actual knowledge of the local standard of care is not intended to be 
·an overly burdensome requirement ... .' Frank v. E S'hoshone Hosp., 114 Idaho 
480,+82, 757P.2d 1199. 1201 (1988). Noristhestandardstaticandfirmlyrooted 
in past medical practices. Standards of care are sensitive to evolving changes in 
the vmy health care services are delivered in the various communities of our State. 
Indeed. the Court has recognized that ·governmental regulation. development of 
regional and national provider organizations. and greater access to the flow of 
medical information,· have provided 'various avenues by which a plaintiff may 
proceed to establish a standard of care .... ' Suhadolnik v. Pressman. 151 Idaho 
110,121,254 P.3d 11, 22 (201 l).'' 
Jfattox v. Life Care Centers o/America, inc., supra, 337 P.3d at 633. 
In applying this analysis, Dr. Steinberg did establish the foundation for his testimony 
necessary to qualify him as an expert under Idaho Code §§ 6-1012-1013. In support of his 
opinion, he cited several Idaho statutes and the Idaho Administrative Code, which suggests that 
all hospitals in Idaho are subject to the nurse anesthesia provisions under the Joint Commission 
standards, as well as the standards set forth by the Council on Certification of Nurse Anesthetists 
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or the on Recertification of Nurse Anesthetists. 5 . L pp. 265-268. That alone was 
him to qualify an expert under the Maltox analysis. Hmvever. he further 
consulted with an Idaho official responsible for oversight of the nursing requirements in 
hospitals, Judith NageL to ensure that there were no exceptions to the rule, i.e. that "rural 
hospitals .. such as BMH did not have to comply v,:ith all of the requirements. 6 R., Vol. L p. 266. 
I'v1s. Nagel also reinforced his understanding that there must be collaboration between the CRNA 
and a qualified physician. R .. Vol. I. p. 267. In a supplemental affidavit, Dr. Steinberg again 
reiterated that the results of his investigation made it abundantly clear that BMH is subject to the 
standards set forth under law, \\hich include the Joint Commission standards. JC Vol. I, p. 428. 
NexL Dr. Steinberg clearly established the nexus between the Joint Commission and 
other standards and the provision of health services in the form of anesthesia care. In essence. 
Dr. Steinberg pointed out the abysmal failures of BMH to have any kind of O\ ersight, guidance, 
policies, procedures. or agreements between the hospital and the nurse anesthesia services (and 
the physicians performing the surgeries). R .. Vol. L p. 267. As a result, BI\1H had absolutely no 
safoty or monitoring standards in place, no performance expectations, no assurance that the 
hospital had the necessary trained staff equipment, and policies, procedures. and facilities "in 
5 In particular, Dr. Steinberg cited IDAPA 16, Title 13, Chapter 14, IDAPA 23, Title 01, 
Chapter 0 1, Idaho Code § 54-1402. R., Vol. I, p. 265. 
6 Ms. Nagel is the Associate Director of the Idaho State Board of Nursing. This agency is 
the regulatory authority over nurse anesthesia services. R., Vol. I, p. 266 See Idaho Code § 54-
1402( 1 )(d)(2). To further assure himself that he was speaking to the appropriate person, Dr. 
Steinberg communicated with the Idaho Chief of the Department of Health and Welfare Bureau 
of Facility Standards, Debra Ransom, who confirmed that the Idaho Board of Nursing regulates 
the provision of nurse anesthesia services in Idaho. R., Vol. I, p. 427, p. 4. 
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pbcc to care for patients like Mr. Navo.''J R .. Vol. L pp. 266-67. Bl\Hrs failures to fulfil its 
statutory and regulatory obligations resulted in a dearth of policies and on~rsight of anesthesia 
services at its hospital. which resulted in inherent dangers to patients, in particular those in Ellery 
Nan) ·s condition. 
In many respects. this case mirrors the Mallox decision. ln that case the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the affidavit of an out-of-stak 
nursing expert, Wendy Thomason. who relied in large part upon being .. familiar with state or 
federal regulations governing that (particular) care.'' J/fatlox r. Life Care Centers o/America. 
inc .. 337 P.3d at 636. As in this case. Nurse Thomason pointed to ··specific state and federal 
regulations governing the operation of' the facility. Id. In so doing. she cited several IDAPA 
regulations that govern the --operation of nursing 1~Kilities." Id. Dr. Steinberg has done the same 
here, pointing out essential regulatory requirements ignored BMH, and hem. those failures 
ultimately affected Mr. Navo's care. 
Dr. Steinberg unequivocally opines that: 
The departures identified above from the mandatory standards of the Joint Commission 
and the requirements of the State of Idaho adversely impacted the provision of care and 
treatment for Mr. Navo and. \.vith a reasonable degree of administrative and medical 
certainty breached the community standard of care owed to him and resulted in his 
eventual death. 
R., Vol. I, p. 268. 
7 This testimony should also be taken in context with that of Dr. Peter Schulman, whose 
affidavit was ultimately allowed by the Court, who indicated in vivid detail the systematic 
failures with regard to Mr. Navo's anesthesia care, which ultimately caused his death. R., Vol. I, 
pp. 273-282. This was particularly true given Mr. Navo's complicated health conditions. Id. 
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This statement alone, taken as true, \\ithout question makes the bet\veen 
of rules and the impact on health care sen ices. such. the 
discretion by suggesting that Dr. Steinberg's testimony did not involve the "physical 
administration of health care services ... R.. Vol. L p. 507. Its decision to strike Dr. Steinberg· s 
anidavit. effectively dismissing Count III ofNavos· complaint against BM}!, should be reversed. 
III. THE DISTRJCT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING O!'i SFW\.IARY Jl 1DG,:\'JE:'IT \VHETHER 
BMH \VAS LIABLE FOR THE CRNA 's CO:\'DlTT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF APPARE'ff 
AlTHORITY. 
A. There \Vere at Least Disputed Issues of Fact that Supported Nan,s' Claim of 
Apparent Authority. 
After striking Navos · hospital expert, Dr. Steinberg, the District Court at first allowed 
Navos· claims against B!v1H on Count One to proceed under an agency theory, that is, that the 
CRNAs had apparent authority to act for BMH in providing anesthesia services at the hospital. 
R., Vol. I, p. 515. Later, after BMH filed its Motion to Reconsider. the District Court ruled as a 
matter of law and undisputed fact that Sayre \Vas not Brv1H's agent. either actually or under the 
theory of apparent authority, taking that determination out of the jury's hands. Vie\ving the 
evidence in the light most favorable light to the Navos, as the non-moving party, that ruling was 
an error. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously weighed in with regard to apparent authority as 
it pertains to support services at hospitals. See, Jones v. Health South Treasure Valley Hosp., 
147 Idaho 109, 206 P.3d 473 (2009). Under Jones, the Idaho Supreme Court overturned the trial 
court's decision to dismiss the hospital defendant, Treasure Valley Hospital (TVH), for vicarious 
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liability of cell saver technicians and the anesthesiologists. both of which were independent 
contractors performing support services at the hospital. Id., 147 Idaho at 111-112. 206 P.3d at 
475-476. In the Factual Background section of its opinion. the Court noted that TVJI's consent 
form did not indicate the cell sawr technicians· status as independent contractors. Id. There is no 
reference to what was contained in the form with regard to the anesthesiologists. and at no other 
point does the opinion reference the consent form as relevant to its decision. The Court 
remanded the case to the trial court to present the question of apparent authority to the jury. Id 
The Jones Court discusses the doctrine of apparent authority at length as it applies to 
support services provided to hospitals by independent contractors: 
"A principal is immune from liability for the negligence of an independent 
contractor. or that of its employees. in the performance of the contracted services. 
Hcnvever. there are exceptions to the general rule, one being the exception referred 
to as · apparent authority.· Liability is imputed to a principal who employs an 
independent contractor to perform senices for another which are accepted in the 
reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by his 
servants.·· Id, 147 Idaho at 112. 206 P.3d at 476. 
The authority is established when it is traceable to the principal" s manifestations: 
·'When determining liability in a situation \\ hen an agency relationship is alleged, 
'apparent authority" is defined as the pffwer held by an agent or other actor to 
affect a principal· s legal relationship with third parties when a third party 
reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and 
that belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations.'· Id. at 114,478. 
A hospital may be Yicariously liable for other indiYiduals performing support services, regardless 
ohvhether they \Vere directly employed: 
'·A hospital may be found vicariously liable for the negligence of other individuals 
performing support services necessary to complete the patient's treatment. If a 
patient does select a particular physician to perform certain procedures ·within the 
hospital setting, this does not alter the fact that a patient may nevertheless still 
reasonably rely upon the hospital to provide the remainder of the support services 
necessary to complete the patient's treatment. Generally, it is the hospital, and not 
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patient. which exercises contra I not only over the provision of necessary 
serYices. but over personnel assigned to those services to 
the patient during the patient's hospital stay To the extent patient reasonably 
relies upon the hospital 10 provide such services, a patient may seek to hold the 
hospital vicariously liable under the apparent agency doctrine for the negligence 
of personnel performing such services even if they are not employed by the 
hospital." Id. at 115,479. 
The hospital owes a duty of care through its employees and independent staff personnel: 
·'Liability extends beyond the hospital/physician context. \Vhen a hospital has 
received a patient. under whatever circumstance. and has undertaken treatment, 
that patient is mved a duty by the hospital through its employees and staff. 
including independent staff personnel. to exercise appropriate care to provide for 
the patient's well-being and to promote his cure. A. breach of this duty may expose 
the hospital to liability in tort ... Some courts recognize hospital liability under 
the doctrine of apparent authority when the hospital has established and staffed 
facilities or departments through which patients receive specialized care from 
medical professionals with whom they do not have a prior or ongoing 
relationship-emergency rooms. operating rooms and anesthesiology and radiology 
departments." Id. 
The standard for determining apparent authority is .. reasonable belieC· not "reliance:· 
·'Furthermore. \Ve find that a standard of'reasonable belief rather than ·reliance· 
more fairly comports with ldaho's prior case lavv regarding apparent authority ... 
We have only required that a person be 'justified in believing· the agent was 
acting pursuant to existing authority, rather than relying on the agent's senices, in 
order to establish apparent authority. We find no persuasive reasoning for 
adopting the more stringent standard ofreliance for cases where the principal is a 
hospital.'. Id. at 481. 117. 
Finally. in remanding the case for a determination of apparent authority of the hospital 
over its ·'independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services,'" the Court 
set forth the elements of such claim: 
"l) conduct by the principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe 
that another person acts on the principal' s behalf, i, e., conduct by the principal 
'holding out' that the person as its agent, and 
"2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably believes it is 
rendered on behalf of the principal." Id. at 1 I 6, 480. 
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Jn this case the District Court relied almost entirely upon the alleged "Conditions of 
Admissions Form"' as well as the holding in i'anclerelde r. Poppens. 552 F. Supp. 2d 662 (W.D. 
Ky 2008)8 to determine. as a matter of indisputable fact and la\v. that Ellery Navo had sufficient 
krn)\vledge to suggest that he was aware that the nurse anesthetists providing anesthesia were not 
under the direction of the hospital. R .. Vol. I, pp. 1020-23. 
Since B\1H clearly held itself out as providing support services for physicians who 
provided care at the hospital. the burden is upon the hospital to show that it provided meaningful 
notice that it did not control those sen ices. The District Court erred by not more closely 
considering the facts and evidence ( or lack thereof) on this point. and should have allnwed the 
question of the hospital's apparent authority to go to a jury. 
Navos presented an abundance of evidence to suggest that the hospital held itself out as 
pnn iding support services, including anesthesia. See Statements of Facts, inj,'a. This included 
the intense marketing campaign advertising such services. the hospital forms. including the 
consent forms, and the listing of a ··manager" of an "anesthesia department" ( \Vith no reference to 
an outside company) on its website. This alone should raise an issue of material fact to support 
the Navos' claim of Sayre· s apparent authority under the hospital· s proYision of anesthesia 
services. The question then becomes whether the hospital provided admissible and undisputed 
evidence of meaningful notice, specifically given to its patient, Ellery Navo, to negate the 
8 It should be noted that the Vandevelde does not involve nursing or other support 
services provided at the defendant hospital, but rather a physician performing emergency room 
services. 
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implication inherent in manner of presenting to the pubhc that support as 
during surgeries at the hospital \Vere not provided by the hospital. 
Under the apparent authority standard of reasonable belief and given the stringent 
standard applicable to summary judgments where the facts are construed in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, BMH has failed to negate that implication. 
As indicated, the District Court relied almost entirely upon the ''Conditions of 
Admission" form prepared by BMH to establish sufficient notice to Ellery Navo. However, in so 
doing, the Court made a serious factual error. Ellery Navo was admitted to BMH on December 
l 5, 2008. R .. Vol. I, p. 273. However, none of the "'Conditions of Admission Forms" submitted 
by BMH in support of its Motion for Reconsideration contain a signature by Ellery on or 
near that date. 0 R., Vol. L pp. 959-970. The only forms provided that have a date are dated 
many years prior to this admission. R., Vol. L pp. 960-964. The rest of the fr)rms are undated, 
giving the court no reason to believe that, on this admission, Ellery Navo was provided any 
notice whatsoever to counter his reasonable belief that Bl'v1H was, like any other hospital, 
providing all of the support services. R., Vol. I, pp. 966-970. Thus, the District Court's reliance 
upon these inelevant documents was improper and insufiicient to eliminate the apparent agency 
established by the Navos' evidence. 
This result is particularly apt since, at the time Ellery Navo was admitted on December 
15, 2008, he was not admitted for surgery. He was admitted because he had a seriously infected 
9 These forms were submitted to the District Court only two days before the hearing on 
the Motion for Reconsideration, not giving Navos sufficient time to review the same, recognize 
the error, and point out the forms' deficiencies to the court. See Navos' "Motion to Strike 
Untimely Affidavits." R., Vol. I, pp. 1006-07. 
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ankle. In focusing on the multitude of standard forms pushed in front of his face in order to be 
admitted for treatment of his infected ankle. there \Vas no serious reason for him to dwell on the 
question of v,hether he could look to BJ\1H, or had to look elsewhere. for superYision and control 
of anesthesia sen ices to be proYided during surgery. Even if such a form had been presented. 
anesthesia ser\ices \\ere not reasonably on Ellery· s mind at the time. He just needed infection 
treatment that \Vas not available outside a hospital. 
Since BMH provided no proof that Ellery Navo had been given this form to rcYievv and 
sign on December 15, 2015. or more particularly once the decision \Vas made SC\ era! days later 
to perform surgery on his ankle. the "strict duty imposed upon the hospital through its employees 
and staff including independent staff personncL to exercise appropriate care to pro\ide fix the 
patient's well-being and to promote his cure .. imposed by Jones still applied. There should be no 
assumption made about any information the hospital did or did not provide, particularly v,:ith 
regard to its support services. 147 ldaho at 115. 206 P.3d at 479. It was an error for the District 
Court to do so. 
The onlv relevant consent form sicrned bv Ellerv Nam incident to the sur2-erv that led to 
• b • • ~ • 
his death is the ''Anesthesia and Procedure Consent Form" on BMH letterhead signed December 
19. 2008, just minutes before the surgery from which he never awoke. R., Vol. L p. 515. 
Nowhere in that BMH form was there any indication that the nurse anesthetists were not 
employees or agents of BMH. Id. 
The Navos have provided sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief by Ellery 
Navo that BMH was the direct provider of its highly-advertized support services, including 
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anesthesia services. ln reply. BY1H failed to pro, ide relevant admissible evidence to counter this 
lll context a motion summary judgment. 
Even if the ··conditions of Admission'· form \Vere relevant and admissible, the District 
Court still erred in granting B:V1H summary judgment on the issue of apparent authority. The 
Jones decision docs not itself address the question of whether such a consent form could absolve 
the hospital from vicarious liability for its support service providers. But there is authority in 
other states. that this Court can consider. that indicates that such a consent form is insufficient. 
A decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals is particularly on point. Dif!,gs v. 
,Yornnt Health. Inc., 177 N.C. App. 290. 296-30L 628 S.E.2d 852. 858-64 (N.C.App. 2006). In 
Dif!,gs. the court considered whether apparent authority applied to anesthesia support services 
provided at the defendant hospital. The court. follmving the Second Restatement of Torts, 
adopted a test similar to that adopted in Idaho: 
--when. however, a hospital does hold itself out as providing services. ,ve believe 
the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 is consistent \vith our 
prior decisions considering apparent agency. We arc also persuaded by the ,veight 
of authority from other jurisdictions. Under this approach, a plaintiff must prove 
that ( 1) the hospital has held itself out as providing medical services, (2) the 
plaintiff looked to the hospital rather than the individual medical provider to 
perform those services, and (3) the patient accepted those services in the 
reasonable belief that the sen ices were being rendered by the hospital or by its 
employees." 
Id. at 862. 
The Diggs court further held that ''A hospital may avoid liability by providing 
meaningful to a patient that care is being provided by an independent contractor." Id. 
(emphasis added). The question then turned on whether the consent forms provided to the 
patient. viewed in the totality of the circumstances, provided ''meaningful notice'' to the patient 
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that the support services \\ ere not being provided by the hospital. In so doing. the court first 
noted the lack of choice the patient had in choosing an anesthesia provider. and with regard iO 
the consent forms, it made a clear distinction hetween !hi! physician proriding the serrices and 
the support services: 
.. Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to meet this test The hospital had a 
Department of Anesthesiology \Vith a Chief of Anesthesiology and a Medical 
Director. a fact that a jury could reasonably find indicated to the public that Fl\1C 
\Vas providing anesthesia services to its patients. Further. defendants chose to 
provide those sen ices by contracting with Piedmont to provide anesthesia 
services to the hospital on an exclusive basis. Piedmont doctors served as the 
hospitars Chief of Anesthesiology and anesthesia !\Jedi cal Director. As Dr. 
McConvil1e put iL his group ·provide[ d] the anesthesia services for the operating 
room at Forsyth and so there is-so our group cm ers the surgical caseload.· 
Plaintiff and other surgical patients had no choice as to who would provide 
anesthesia services for their operations. 
'"Plaintiffs affidavit states that she \\as unaware that Dr. McConville and Ms. 
Crumb \Vere not employees of the hospital. She explained. 'I did not select Sheila 
Crumb nor Dr. Joseph McConville to provide medical care to me: that in choosing 
to have my operation at Fors.:,ih :tvledical Center. J relied on the fact that medical 
care: would be provided by employees of Forsyth Medical Center. excluding my 
surgeon, Dr. Goco.' She further stated: ·[O]ne of the reasons that I had my 
operation performed at Forsyth Medical Center was because it was part of Novant 
Health. a large healthcare organization .... · 
"In addition, plaintiffpointed to thefcmn on FA1C letterhead that she signed 
entitled 'Consent lO Operation and/or Other Procedures.· The form specified: 'I 
therefore authorize my physician, his or her associates or assistants to perform 
such surgical procedures as they. in the exercise of their professional judgment, 
deem necessary and ad\ isable.' (Emphasis added.) By contrast, -with respect to 
anesthesia services. the.form stated: 'J authorize the administration ofsuch 
anesthetics as may be necessary or advisable by the anesthetist/anesthesiologist 
responsible for this service and I request the administration of such anesthetics.' 
(Emphasis added.) Finally, the form stated: 'I have had sufficient opportunity to 
discuss my condition and treatment with my physician and his or her associates 
and all of my questions have been ans\vered to my satisfaction.' (Emphasis 
added.) 
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This consent form stands in contrast to that provided to the patient in Hoffman. A 
could on this lhat through thisfonn 
requesting anesthesia servicesfrom F\1C and that---given the 
benreen plaintitl's personal physician and the unnamed 
anesthesiologist-plaintiff\rns accepting those services in the reasonable belief 
that the services 11auld be provided by the ho.\pizal and its employees. 
Id 862-63 (emphasis added except vvhere noted in text). 
In this case, sirni lar to the Diggs decision. a jury could construe that the language 
contained in the ··conditions of Admission Form" applies on~v to services provided by or under 
the direction of the physician. and not to support services. The specific language of the consent 
form entitled ''LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BET\VEEN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN" itself 
suggests that unless .. otherwise informed in writing'· it only applies to "physicians furnishing 
services .. :· R .. Vol. L p. 966. ~ 6. In contrast, Section 1 of the form suggests that the hospital 
lists ··anesthesia" as one of a multitude of distinct services it is providing, including but not 
limited to ·'laboratory procedures, radiology procedures, diagnostic procedures, sleep lab stress 
testing. medicaL nursing or surgical treatment or procedures. anesthesia, pathology. emergency 
procedures. first surgical assistant or hospital services rendered to me under the general and 
special instructions of my physician." R., Vol 1. p. 965. § 1. This form is also separate and 
distinct from the "Anesthesia and Procedure Consent Fom1" that Ellery Navo signed actually 
authorizing a specific nurse anesthetist to provide his anesthesia care. R.. Vol. L p. 950. Again, 
that form does not identify the nurse anesthetist as a non-employee or as an independent 
contractor of the hospital. 
A jury could therefore find that these forms. and the language therein, could have caused 
Ellery Navo to reasonably distinguish anesthesia services that are provided by a non-employee 
"physician., from such services provided by a hospital employee. This is particularly true given 
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the fact that Mr. Navo signed a separate and distinct consent form specifically for the anesthesia 
services that does not identif\ the nurse anesthetist as a non-employee. Thus. notwithstanding the 
admission forms. this is a question that should go before the jury. 
B. The District Court Had No Basis to Dismiss Navos' Claims for Not Pleading 
"'Apparent Authority" as a "Cause of Action." 
The District Court held that because .. apparent authority"' was not plead as "a cause of 
action·· in Navos· complaint, Navos did not meet the liberal pleading requirements of IRCP ~ 
8(aJ( 1 ). This decision by the Court is non-sensical and unreasonable. 
Count One of Navos · Complaint states. in its first two paragraphs: 
19. The defendants, as providing health sen·ices to the public. m:ved the plaintiffs· 
decedent Ellery Navo. and the plaintiffs. as heirs. a duty of care. 
20. That duty of care required that the defendants and their agents failed to exercise 
their best medical judgment and render care consistent \\ith the local standard of 
care. 
R., Vol. L p. 28. 
All that is required under the Idaho Rules of Procedure for a proper complaint is for the 
plaintiffs to 1) provide a plain statement of the grounds of the court· s jurisdiction, 2) a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and 3) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to v,hich (the plaintiff) deems he is entitled. IRCP § 8(a)(l) The Navos' 
complaint easily meets this basic .. notice pleading"· requirement. The Complaint simply claims 
that BMH provided health services along with the other defendants, and that the negligent 
perfonnance of such duties by the hospital or its agents resulted in the wrongful death of Ellery 
Navo. Therefore, BMH had notice ofNavos' claims, including the theories of the claim. i.e. 
vvrongful death resulting from the defendants' or their agents' negligent care. 
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Because BrvlH never an ;;ms,ver to the · Complaint and hccause the issue of 
was not in the initial summary judgment the issue apparent 
authority did not become relernnt until after BMH filed a motion for summary judgment 
claiming that Sayre and Monroe. as nurse anesthetists, were not employees of the hospital and 
therefore not B\tH· s agents. R. Vol. L pp. 4. 40-41. Prior to that time it \Vas not necessary for 
the NaYos to make the claim of apparent agency, since BMH had not enumerated any attirmative 
defenses to Navos · claims. 
Navos had appropriately plead facts sufficient to raise a question of agency. Although it 
did not specifically plead ·'apparent authority.'' it is patently unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to 
anticipate all possible defenses to his or her allegations and to plead legal theories that refute 
those defenses in the }ctce oft ht! complaint. The District Court therefore ahuscd its discretion by 
holding Navos to this extreme standard of pleading. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons. this Court should reverse the District Court·s decision to dismiss 
Navos· complaint against BMH and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 3rd day of April. 2015. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
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